[P]urely instrumentally rational agents cannot reason themselves into being rule followers and yet rule following seems absolutely critical to social life. What reason cannot achieve on its own, cultural (and biological) evolution has: normal humans have evolved into social creatures who care about following moral rules. So far from being mysterious, our best understanding of the evolution of social cooperation strongly endorses the conclusion that Rule-following Punishers — agents who care about following moral rules and ensuring that others follow them too — are a prerequisite of a cooperative social order. Thus Hayek rightly points out that our reason presupposes morality (and our caring for it) as much as it presupposes our goals; it does not construct either.
— Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 146–147.
And from Gene Callahan:
The whole question really depends on our understanding of the relation of abstract and concrete. It is plain, as Green says, that the idea of a common good has never been the sole influence operative in the formation or maintenance of States. And, in so far as it has operated at all, it has done so in very imperfect forms.
— Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 289